bill. Senators say we ought to take up the bill and offer amendments to it. That would be starting out on the wrong premise. The whole subject was started on the wrong premise when the communications carriers themselves were asked what ought to be done with the satellite. They said, "Give it to us." I do not know why the Government went through the rigmarole of getting an exemption from the antitrust laws. The answer inevitably would be, if there were something really valuable and there were a group looking after their own interests, "Give it to us." That is what the answer was in this instance.

As I have said, we who oppose the consideration of the bill at this time have stressed, over and over again, the complex international negotiations that must be conducted before a satellite system can come into operation successfully. These negotiations so directly and vitally affect the national interest of all the nations concerned that they will have to be conducted on an intergovernmental level. On June 12 of this year I placed into the RECORD a newspaper report about the difficulties we were having in trying to achieve cooperation with the Soviet Union. At that time I noted that Mrs. Roosevelt and President Kennedy had also stressed the great value from international cooperation in this realm" and noted further than in the realm of space—

The difficulties demonstrated by an article in this morning's Washington Post, entitled "U.S. Rejects Soviet Plan for Controls on Space," in which it was reported that the Soviet Government has suggested that all space activities should be carried out solely and exclusively by soverign states. It is very possible that many states—both Communist and non-Communist—will agree with the U.S.S.R. on this proposal.

At this time, only two things are clear. It is absolutely essential that we obtain international cooperation in space among the nations of the world for peaceful purposes, and second, that such cooperation will involve extremely delicate, complex, and protracted negotiations among the governments concerned.

This point was confirmed a few days ago in a most interesting front-page article entitled "Wavelength Rift Threatening Use of TV Satellites," written by John W. Finney, and published in the New York Times of July 29, 1962. I am sure that all of us know Mr. Finney. He is a highly respected member of the press and a journalist who has been in Washington for a long time. I should like to read portions of his article, which show some of the extremely difficult political and diplomatic problems that exist:

WAVELENGTH RIFT THREATENING USE OF TV SATELLITES

(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON, July 28.—The problem of wavelength allocations is providing the first critical test of whether the nations of the world are willing to cooperate in establishing a global communications system with satellites.

There already are indications of an East-West conflict that could jeopardize the coverage of such a system.

The United States has suggested that two microwave bands with a total width of about 3,000 megacycles be assigned to satellite systems.

The proposal has drawn a generally favorable response from the non-Soviet nations, although some countries have raised questions on the necessity for setting aside so much of the microwave spectrum for this purpose.

The Soviet Union has proposed that a much narrower band of frequencies, totaling only 950 megacycles, be assigned for space communications.

The Soviet proposal, in what U.S. officials acknowledge was a deft move, would assign frequencies that fall within the bands being used by U.S. military radar.

DECISION DUE IN 1963

The issue will come to a head in the fall of 1963, when the International Telecommunications Union—the 113-member organization charged with maintaining technical cooperation in the use of radio—will hold an extraordinary administrative radio conference to determine the frequencies for satellite systems.

Both nationally and internationally the problem of frequency allocation has become enmeshed in the political problems. In many instances it has been the frequency question that has prompted the political decision.

It was a proposal by the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. that microwave frequencies be set aside exclusively for communications satellites, a proposal that private users of the frequencies viewed as a "power grab," that began to raise the question of telephone company "domination" and turned the tide against a satellite corporation owned primarily by the company.

I digress to say that many private companies feel that this was and is a power group effort for domination. I believe this is typical of the kind of situation we shall be getting into internationally if we allow the signing of wavelengths and other phases of our foreign relations to a private corporation, particularly one that has a great financial interest in the subject.

These factors are now having their impact in the international realm.

There is also a possibility, causing considerable concern among some U.S. officials, that political considerations could prevent technical agreement.

For example, there is a fear that suggestions that a communications satellite system developed by the United States would be used for beaming propaganda broadcasts would make other nations reluctant to agree to allocation of frequencies.

Another source of concern is the Defense Department's development of its own satellite systems. Indirectly, some nations are already raising the question of why such a large part of the radio spectrum should be set aside, when part of it would be used by the U.S. military services.

Unlike most frequency allocation problems, that of communications satellites does not involve exclusive use of a frequency. Both United States and Soviet experts are agreed that there can be sharing of frequencies by the satellites and microwave point-to-point radio and telephone systems on the ground.

The only requirement would be a radio-quiet area around the ground receiving stations so there would be no interference with the extremely faint signals from the satellites.

International agreement, however, is necessary to prevent the frequencies assigned for satellites from being used for such other purposes as high-powered radar or the tropospheric scatter method of communications.

COULD PRODUCE INTERFERENCE

Without such agreement, there could be interference by ground stations with the radio signals received and transmitted by the satellite.

For example, if the Soviet Union declined to agree to the allocation, its radar or tropospheric scatter systems could interfere with the signals of a satellite passing near its territory.

One of the principal reasons the United States sought to put an experimental communications satellite into orbit as soon as possible was to provide a demonstration that would help convince other nations of the desirability of agreeing to the allocation of frequencies.

Mr. President, a little later on, the article reads as follows:

Such an allocation, according to U.S. estimates, would be capable of handling several satellite systems and meeting the demands of international communications traffic through 1975.

SOVIET GIVES POSITION

The preliminary Soviet position, presented at a meeting of the International Radio Consultative Committee in March, was that the frequency allocations be from 3,500 to 3,650 megacycles, from 4,350 to 4,700 megacycles, and from 5,670 to 6,170 megacycles.

At this point U.S. officials are hopeful but uncertain that the United States and Soviet positions can be reconciled in the 1963 meeting.

One inauspicious sign was the Soviet refusal in the bilateral space cooperation talks this spring to discuss cooperation in the development and use of active communications satellites.

Some U.S. officials expect that the Soviet Union will probably continue to be reluctant to discuss cooperation until it launches its own communications satellites—a project that it has discussed in its scientific literature but thus far not carried into being.

Mr. President, in that connection, all the literature and information being put out and all available statements by Soviet scientists definitely show that when the Soviets do develop a satellite for such use, it will be a high-orbit satellite, not a low-orbit satellite such as our Telstar.

I should like to make one correction in this story. The problem of frequency allocations has been a political problem since the invention of radio. As shown in a study by Prof. Dallas W. Smythe, of the University of Illinois, entitled "The Structure and Policy of Electronic Communications," the problem of frequency allocations has been a controversial issue in the cold war since the end of World War II.

These international aspects of the satellite system have been brought home to us recently by the various experiments involving British, French, and American television. It must be kept in mind that this communications development is taking place simultaneously with one of the most momentous political and economic events of our time—the growth and expansion of the Common Market. As Walter Lippmann has repeatedly stressed, the development of the Common Market presages the establishment of an Atlantic community, and satellite communications will play a vital part in this development. The satellite question thus has an additional political and economic ramification which lends additional

urgency to the need for thorough and lengthy consideration of these international problems.

The administration is aware of at least some of these problems. As reported in the New York Times on July 12 of this year, the White House has just recently initiated a study of some of these international complications. Mr. Jack Gould reported in that story that—

Among the issues expected to be studied—

The reference is to the study initiated by the White House, as I understand, and being conducted by the FCC—

are the growing role of television as a factor in the implementation of foreign policy, the delicate task of harmonizing governmental and private interests in the field of global video, the possibility of assisting emerging nations to develop their own domestic video facilities, and the encouragement of exchanges with foreign television networks.

He went on to point out that—

In many countries broadcasting is a direct arm of government and, should heads of state become parties to an international exchange program, the State Department is virtually forced to become involved lest feelings be hurt on the diplomatic level.

These news reports prove several things:

First, that international intergovernmental agreements must be concluded before any worldwide satellite system can operate. Mr. President, all of us know this to be true. There cannot be an international satellite system until agreements on a worldwide basis are made.

Second, and this conclusion is inescapable—that protection of the national interest requires that they be on an intergovernmental level. If we let a private corporation handle these negotiations, we shall be prejudicing the national interest and insuring failure.

Mr. President, I wonder how many persons can envision the holding of Cabinet-level meetings of, let us say, the British, the French, the Italians, the Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Union, and some of the nationalistic countries of Asia, Africa, and South America—all Ministers able to speak for their Governments.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Tennessee permit the Chair to lay before the Senate an appointment to membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I am very happy to stop for a while, so as to permit the distinguished Vice President to do so.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Pursuant to Public Law 703 of the 83d Congress, the Chair names Senator EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, of Illinois, to the vacancy on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy caused by the death of Senator Henry C. Dworshak, of Idaho.

COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion of Mr. MANSFIELD that the Senate proceed to consider the bill (H.R. 11040) to provide for the establishment, ownership, operation, and regulation of a commercial communications satellite system, and for other purposes.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, such Cabinet-level representatives of the various nations, some of whom do not like private monopoly, would meet with the representative of our country, who perhaps would be Mr. Dingman or some other representative of a private American corporation, trying to speak for the Government of the United States.

But, Mr. President, let the people of the country know that never in all the history of our country have we undertaken to delegate to a private monopoly the foreign relations of our country, and thus bind ourselves by the decision of that private monopoly. Never before has that been done in this country. Why? Because we are a sovereign government. We do not form an East India Co. and give it powers of government. We never have operated in that way; and even if we did, we would not be successful.

The second reason why we have not done so is that we would not get anywhere if we did—not even in the times of kings, emperors, and dictators, and certainly we would not get anywhere in that way at a time when most of the nations of the world operate their own telephone and other communications systems as part of their own governmental operations.

We are not going to get anywhere when there are some nations that do not have democracy, freedom, and the democratic way of life. Much as we do not like the Soviet Union, somehow, in some way, we are going to have to enter into an agreement with her if we are to have an international satellite communications system, whether we like it or not. I wish it were possible to have one and, somehow, be able to tell the Soviet Union it could not have any part of it, but we know that is not possible. We know Russia is a great force in rocketry and space. We know they are working hard at it. We know that in some ways they have excelled us, and in some ways we have excelled them. We know we are going to have to work out some agreement.

Can we visualize Mr. Dingman, representing a private monopoly, sitting down and working out an agreement with Khrushchev? Even our Government has a hard enough time doing it, but we would concede defeat before we even started. They have already told us they are not going to do it. Yet, without exploring the matter further, without talking with them about it, we are going to freeze a situation that will make it impossible for us to move.

I have no patience with those who are saying, "We have got to pass the bill to get going." The best way to get stopped is to pass the bill. The best way to insure that the United States will not be successful is to pass the bill.

Third, no operational system is possible for many years, at least, because the frequency allocation conference will not take place until November 1963, without which no fully international operational system can go into effect.

Aside from the fact that in research and development it will be 2 or 3, or 4 years before we can have a commercially operative system, nothing can be done until the meeting on frequency allocations in November 1953. The Senate can be sure the matter will not be settled even then. There will be discussions. There will be committees. There will be delayed meetings. Then, after the allocations, if and when they are assigned, adjustments will have to be worked out. So, there is no hurry. There is no reason to attempt to bulldoze or steamroller this bill through. There is every reason why we ought to have time and see where we are going.

It is for these reasons that we call for deferral of this matter and ask that the Foreign Relations Committee be given an opportunity to study the matter. We have nothing to lose and much to gain from such a course: our research and development in Telstar, Relay, Syncom, and all the rest, now at the threshold stages, will proceed at top speed without any such legislation. The Telstar experiment showed that legislation is unnecessary for such research. And because of these international complexities, as the House Science Committee concluded, we must retain maximum flexibility and not prematurely freeze a situation that should remain fluid.

I heard the Senator from Rhode Island talk about the position of the State Department. In the first place, the State Department can be wrong. It is not infallible. Many of us have seen wrong decisions made. I know Mr. McGhee is a fine man. Just because he is willing to delegate the sovereignty of the United States in international affairs and thinks we can get by with it does not make it true and it does not convince me. I do not know what influences were in his mind or what considerations may have been in his mind. Many of us have known for a long, long time something which is just now coming out into the open. It is not true that the State Department and the Justice Department are fully behind this bill, regardless of what the public pronouncements may be. Anybody can go to the Justice Department and find that there has been a wide breach of thinking about this bill; that at first the majority were against the bill; and efforts were made; and finally a majority, apparently, in the State Department have gone along, through the persuasion, apparently, of Mr. Katzenbach. But many in the Department most directly concerned are much opposed to the bill.

The same is true in the Department of State. They are not fully behind it, regardless of the public pronouncements.

It was reported in the Washington News of yesterday that—

The communications satellite bill being filibustered by Senate liberals seems to have full White House backing, though State and Justice Departments are not happy about some provision. The bill provides that the satellite corporation can carry on business negotiations abroad, merely advising the State Department what it is doing. There is some feeling this conflicts with the constitutional requirement that all foreign relations be handled by the President through the State Department.